Pursuant to s 93(5) of the Legal Profession Act, the Council of the Law Society is required to publish the findings and determination of the Disciplinary Committee in the Singapore Law Gazette or in such other media as the Council may determine to adequately inform the public of the same.
This summary is published pursuant to the requirement of s 93(5) of the Legal Profession Act.
Findings and Determination of the Disciplinary Committee
In the Matter of Kirpal Singh s/o Hakam Singh, an Advocate and Solicitor
The Disciplinary proceedings against the Respondent arose from a complaint which alleged that the Respondent whilst on a visit to the Complainant’s home (purportedly to assess the value of the property) had made verbal advances for the Complainant to perform a belly dance for the Respondent. As a consequence of the charge, the Law Society formulated and preferred the following charge against the Respondent.
Charge
That you, Kirpal Singh s/o Hakam Singh are charged that you have conducted yourself in such a manner which amounts to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of s 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (the “Act”) to wit, whilst at the residence of your client on or about 7 February 2007, at or around 11pm, in your professional capacity, had asked her to perform a belly dance.
Findings of the Disciplinary Tribunal
From the onset of the hearing, the Respondent vehemently denied that he had asked the Complainant to perform a belly dance. The Disciplinary Tribunal found the Respondent’s assertion that he had gone to his client’s residence to assess the value of the property to be highly implausible and unlikely and that he chose to go at such a late hour, casts doubts about the veracity of his account. In particular, the Disciplinary Tribunal took cognizance of the fact that the Respondent had sent an SMS to her and enquired whether she needed “food, wine or drinks” and accepted the Complainant’s version of events in particular that the Respondent was there at her premises to pass some documents to her.
The Disciplinary Tribunal noted that the Complainant was firm and unshaken over the course of a vigorous cross examination by the Respondent’s Counsel and was envinced that her evidence was generally consistent. The Disciplinary Tribunal also considered the testimonials of other witnesses produced by the Respondent but found none of the evidence material to the findings of the Disciplinary Tribunal. Nonetheless, the Disciplinary Tribunal found the testimonial of the Respondent’s sister (who was alleged to be waiting in the car for him) contradictory and irreconcilable with that of the Respondent. The Disciplinary Tribunal found the Respondent guilty of misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of s 83(2) of the Act.
At the end of the proceedings, the Disciplinary Tribunal noted that despite the verbal advances made by the Complainant, he did not persist or attempt to cajole the Respondent when she refused. The Disciplinary Tribunal therefore determined under s 93(1)(b) of the Act that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists against the Respondent, he be reprimanded for his misconduct. In addition, the Disciplinary Tribunal also ordered the Respondent to pay the costs of the proceedings before the Disciplinary Tribunal to the Law Society to be taxed by the Registrar pursuant to s 93(2) of the Act.
Council’s Decision
Council accepted the findings and determination of the Disciplinary Committee.
In the Matter of Zulkifli Bin Mohd Amin, an Advocate and Solicitor
The proceedings arose from a property conveyance in which it was alleged that the Respondent was derelict in his professional duties to the Complainants, having repeatedly failed without legitimate excuse to meet the deadlines for progressive payment to the developers, eventually resulting in the developer rescinding the Sale and Purchase Agreement (the “Agreement”) and forfeiting, inter alia, 20 per cent of the purchase price. Further, the Complainants alleged that the Respondent had kept them in the dark about the progress of the conveyance, and had eventually absconded.
Three charges and alternative charges were preferred against the Respondent.
First Charge
That you, Zulkifli Mohd Amin, an Advocate and Solicitor, are guilty of a breach of r 12 of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules, Legal Profession Act (Chapter 16) (sic) (the “Rules”), in that you failed to use all reasonably available legal means consistent with your retainer to advance the interest of the Complainants in the manner entrusted to you by the Complainants ie, the purchase of the property at 199 Telok Kurau Road, #05-02 Cadence Light, Singapore 423833, and such breach of the Rules amounts to grossly improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duty within the meaning of s 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act.
Alternative First Charge
That you, Zulkifli Mohd Amin, an Advocate and Solicitor, are guilty of a breach of r 12 of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules, Legal Profession Act (Chapter 16) (sic) (the “Rules”), in that you failed to use all reasonably available legal means consistent with your retainer to advance the interest of the Complainants in the manner entrusted to you by the Complainants ie, the purchase of the property at 199 Telok Kurau Road, #05-02 Cadence Light, Singapore 423833, and such breach of the Rules amounts to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of s 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act.
Second Charge
That you, Zulkifli Mohd Amin, an Advocate and Solicitor, are guilty of a breach of r 17 of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules, Legal Profession Act (Chapter 16) (sic) (the “Rules”), in that you failed to keep the Complainants reasonably informed of the progress of the matter entrusted to you by the Complainants ie, the purchase of the property at 199 Telok Kurau Road, #05-02 Cadence Light, Singapore 423833, and such breach of the Rules amounts to grossly improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duty within the meaning of s 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act.
Alternative Second Charge
That you, Zulkifli Mohd Amin, an Advocate and Solicitor, are guilty of a breach of r 17 of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules, Legal Profession Act (Chapter 16) (sic) (the “Rules”), in that you failed to keep the Complainants reasonably informed of the progress of the matter entrusted to you by the Complainants ie, the purchase of the property at 199 Telok Kurau Road, #05-02 Cadence Light, Singapore 423833, and such breach of the Rules amounts to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of
s 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act.
Third Charge
That you, Zulkifli Mohd Amin, an Advocate and Solicitor, are guilty of a breach of r 21 of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules, Legal Profession Act (Chapter 16) (sic) (the “Rules”), in that you failed to explain to the Complainants the letters or notices received by you from PKWA Law Practice LLC, acting for the developers, dated 6 August 2007, 27 August 2007, 4 September 2007, 11 September 2007 and 3 October 2007 which affected the Complainants and such breach of the Rules amounts to grossly improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duty within the meaning of s 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act.
Alternative Third Charge
That you, Zulkifli Mohd Amin, an Advocate and Solicitor, are guilty of a breach of r 21 of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules, Legal Profession Act (Chapter 16) (sic) (the “Rules”), in that you failed to explain to the Complainants the letters or notices received by you from PKWA Law Practice LLC (“PKWA”), acting for the developers, dated 6 August 2007, 27 August 2007, 4 September 2007, 11 September 2007 and 3 October 2007 which affected the Complainants and such breach of the Rules amounts to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of s 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (the “Act”) .
Findings of the Disciplinary Tribunal
The Respondent did not avail himself during the proceedings of the Disciplinary Tribunal. The Respondent was found guilty of all the charges preferred against him. It remains that the Respondent was on the Complainants’ retainer for the express purpose of completing the purchase of a property. In this regard, he had not only failed to effect timely payments for the completion of the purchase, it was inexcusable not to effect these payments as he was also acting for the bank in the matter of the execution of the mortgage on the property and had knowledge that there were sufficient cash that had been set aside for the progress payments. Further, his lack of communication (which formed the basis of the second and its alternative) with the Complainants left them completely in the dark till it became public knowledge that he had absconded that they became aware that the purchase was never completed. Inevitably, his actions caused considerable loss to the Complainants which the Disciplinary Tribunal found was grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty within the meaning of
s 83(2)(b) of the Act read with r 12 of the Rules as well as guilty of misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor under s 83(2)(h) of the Act.
On the third charge and its alternative, the Disciplinary Tribunal found that the Respondent had acted in breach of r 21 of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules by failing to explain the position that was taken by Seller with regard to the purchase of the Property. It was evident that the Respondent completely failed to inform or explain to the Complainants the notice and reminders of payment from the solicitors for the sellers, PKWA. Most crucially, he had failed to inform or explain to the Complainants of PKWA’s letter of 11 September 2007 pursuant to which the sellers exercised its right of rescission which entailed the forfeiture of 20 per cent of the Purchase Price by the Seller.
At the end of the proceedings, the Disciplinary Tribunal found under s 93(1)(c) of the Act that cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists against the Respondent under s 83 of the Act. Pursuant to s 93(2) of the Act, the Respondent was also ordered to pay costs.
Council’s Decision
Council accepted the findings and determination of the Disciplinary Committee and pursuant to s 94 of the Act, applied under s 98 of the said Act for “show cause” proceedings against the Respondent.
The Court of Three Judges
The Court of Three Judges directed the Law Society to make an application for this matter to be heard together with another matter involving the Respondent and his former partners. The Respondent did not avail himself before Chan Sek Keong CJ, Chao Hick Tin JA and Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA on 6 August 2010 and having considered the merits of the determination of both Disciplinary Tribunals against the Respondent, ordered him to be struck off the Roll of advocate and solicitors.
In the Matter of Choy Chee Yean, an Advocate and Solicitor
The source of the proceedings stems from two offences under the Theft Ordinance that the respondent had been charged with in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong SAR Courts had suspended his 12 months’ imprisonment sentence.
The Law Society contended that had the offence been committed in Singapore it would have been an offence contrary to s 380 of the Penal Code and punishable under s 378 of the Penal Code. However, both the charge and the Statement of Claim were amended at the onset of the proceedings; the Law Society’s position and basis was that dishonesty was not one of the elements of the charge levied against the Respondent. Accordingly, the following amended charge was tendered before the Disciplinary Tribunal.
Amended Charge
That you, Choy Chee Yean, an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore are charged that you on or about 21 April 2008 were convicted by the District Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of an offence of burglary under s 11(1)(b) and (4) of the Hong Kong Theft Ordinance (Cap 210), the particulars of the offence being that you –
“on 17 January 2008, in Hong Kong, having entered as a trespasser part of a building known as Room 1935, Novotel Citygate Hotel, No 51 Man Tung Road, Tung Chung, Lantau Island, New Territories, stole therein one bag, one Bluetooth earphone, one charger, one iPod, one mobile phone, one mobile phone SIM card and one palm pilot.”
and you have thereby committed an act of misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of s 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (the “Act”).
Findings of the Disciplinary Tribunal
From the onset of the hearing, the Respondent pleaded guilty to the amended charge and conceded that the matter should go before the Court of Three Judges. Nonetheless the Disciplinary Tribunal was compelled to make a finding on the issue of dishonesty since evidence on the matter was adduced during the cross-examination of the affidavit of the Respondent and his psychiatrist.
The Disciplinary Tribunal conceded that significant weight must be placed upon the Respondent’s guilty plea and resulting conviction in Hong Kong. In addition, it would appear that the statutory presumption under s 45 of the Evidence Act does not apply to the Respondent in light of the fact that this was not a conviction in Singapore.
At the end of the proceedings, the Disciplinary Tribunal concluded that the evidence adduced by both parties was less than satisfactory and that the Law Society had failed to adduce evidence of professional psychiatric opinion on the Respondent’s state of mind at the time of the commission of the offence. The Disciplinary Tribunal therefore determined under s 93(1) of the Act that cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action existed against the Respondent but the Law Society had not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Respondent was dishonest at the time of committing the offence.
Council’s Decision
Council accepted the findings and determination of the Disciplinary Committee and pursuant to s 94 of the Act, applied under s 98 of the said Act for “show cause” proceedings against the Respondent under s 83(2)(h) of the Act.
The Court of Three Judges
Accordingly, the Respondent appeared before Chan Sek Keong CJ, Chao Hick Tin JA and Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA on 5 April 2010. The Court of Three Judges noted that the Disciplinary Tribunal had on its own accord conducted an independent inquiry as to whether or not the Respondent was dishonest but ruled that the Hong Kong conviction was by itself material and should be considered. The Court of Three Judges also noted that the Disciplinary Tribunal had found that the failure on the part of the Law Society to adduce psychiatric evidence did not justify the Disciplinary Tribunal’s finding that no dishonesty had been proved vis-à-vis the Respondent. Having regard to the Hong Kong conviction, the Court of Three Judges found that the Respondent was, in fact, guilty of dishonesty although there were strong mitigating factors that stemmed from his medical condition.
Accordingly, in arriving at the appropriate sanction to be meted out to the Respondent, the Court of Three Judges was of the view that work pressure or stress should never be an excuse for a lawyer to act dishonestly as the legal profession could not be seen to be tolerant of any act of dishonesty on the part of an advocate and solicitor, even if the dishonesty has been of a technical nature (such as in the present case). The Respondent was therefore ordered to be struck off the Roll of advocates and solicitors and to bear the costs of the proceedings.
At the same time, the Court of Three Judges also found that in view of the special mitigating circumstances with respect to the Hong Kong conviction, the Respondent was not likely to repeat such conduct. Under the circumstances, the Court of Three Judges was of the view that the Respondent could possibly apply for reinstatement to the Roll within a relatively short period of time.
In the Matter of Gurdaib Singh s/o Pala Singh, an Advocate and Solicitor
The Disciplinary proceedings against the Respondent stemmed from consent orders in respect of an interim judgment obtained with regards to the disposal of the matrimonial property where the Respondent had acted for the Complainant in the sale of the property. The Respondent was alleged to have acted in conflict of interest and failed to account to the Complainant on the net proceeds from the sale of the property and had misled the Complainant on the amount of her claims, among others.
Accordingly, a total of 10 charges were preferred upon the Respondent by the Law Society but following new developments in the divorce suit and representations made by the Respondent, the charges and the Statement of Claim were amended. In particular, the Family Court had ruled that the Complainant had no claim to the net sales proceeds. As a result, the Respondent faced only two charges, one under s 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (the “Act”) and another under s 83(2)(h) of the Act.
First Charge
That you, Gurdaib Singh s/o Pala Singh are guilty of improper conduct for failing to respond or reply in writing to a legitimate reply in writing by a fellow advocate and solicitor made on 28 February 2008 and 21 July 2008 pertaining to the Complainant’s request for the balance of proceeds of sale to be paid to her and such breach amounts to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of s 83(2)(h) of the Act.
Second Charge
That you, Gurdaib Singh s/o Pala Singh are guilty of improper conduct for failing to keep the Complainant reasonably informed of the progress of the transaction relating to the sale of the matrimonial property in writing and which is a breach of r 17 of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules and you have thereby breached a rule of conduct made by the Council of the Law Society under the provisions of the Act as amounts to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor under s 83(2)b() of the Act.
Findings of the Disciplinary Tribunal
From the onset of the hearing, the Respondent pleaded guilty to both charges preferred against him but submitted through his Counsel that there was no cause for sufficient gravity for disciplinary action under s 83 of the Act and that a reprimand would suffice. In mitigation, the Respondent submitted that he had orally informed the Complainant that she would not receive the net proceeds of the sale and had informed her solicitor orally of the same upon receipt of his letter on the Complainant’s request. In addition, the Respondent also mentioned that he was facing a difficult time on a personal front accruing from his mother’s illness.
The Disciplinary Tribunal conceded that there was no allegation or evidence of dishonesty or grossly improper conduct and as such it was of the view that there is no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action to be taken under s 83 of the Act. Nonetheless, the breaches were the result of unfortunate lapses and shoddy behaviour; had the Respondent conscientiously and promptly kept the Complainant informed of the progress of the sale of the property in writing, there would have been no proceedings against him.
At the end of the proceedings, the Disciplinary Tribunal determined under s 93(1)(b) of the Act that whilst no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action existed against the Respondent, that he be reprimanded for his misconduct.
Council’s Decision
Council accepted the findings and determination of the Disciplinary Tribunal.