FEATURE

Right of access to counsel is an important part of due process. When a person is arrested, he is entitled to meet his lawyer within a “reasonable time”. What is a reasonable time? This article proposes a conceptual framework to approach this question.

Access to Counsel – A Multi-faceted Enquiry

This article is about the right of access to counsel found at art 9(3) of the Constitution. Right of access to counsel is an important part of due process. When a person is arrested, he is entitled to meet his lawyer within a “reasonable time”.1 What is a reasonable time? How can it be shown that a period of time is reasonable? These are useful practical questions. Yet they cannot be answered in a theoretical vacuum. It will be contended that in order to assess what “reasonable time” means, the enquiry must start and end with the values that underpin the administration of criminal justice in Singapore.

James Raj s/o Arokiasamy v Public Prosecutor

The applicant in James Raj s/o Arokiasamy v Public Prosecutor [2014] SGHC 10 (“James Raj”) was suspected of having carried out computer attacks on several websites under the alias “The Messiah”.2 He was also charged for a number of drugs-related offences. He had been arrested on 4 November 2013. His lawyers requested access to the applicant on 11 November 2013, which was rejected. On 3 December 2013, the police finally allowed the applicant access to his lawyers. 

In the meantime, the applicant’s lawyers had filed a Criminal Motion on 13 November 2013 seeking a declaration that there was “an immediate right to counsel upon the request of a person remanded for investigations”. It would appear that after the hearing on 15 November 2013, the applicant’s lawyers made further submissions on an alternative position: that an arrested person was entitled access to counsel after a “reasonable time” of 48 hours.3

Judgment was delivered on 14 January 2014. By that time, the applicant had already been granted access to his counsel (on 3 December 2013). But the Court nonetheless proceeded to make some valuable observations.

First, the Court held that it was bound by the Court of Appeal’s decision in Jasbir Singh and another v Public Prosecutor [1994] 1 SLR(R) 782. That case had held that there was no immediate right to counsel.4 Instead, the right to counsel arose only after a “reasonable time”. 

Second, the Court affirmed that the burden was on the prosecution to satisfy the Court that it was “reasonable” to withhold access to counsel.5 Third, the Court held that on the facts (or lack of facts) before it, the prosecution failed to show that it had been reasonable to withhold access to counsel, at least from 11 November 2013 onwards.6 It is perhaps these last two aspects of the judgment, rather than any novel statement of the law, that has excited some comment.7

A “Reasonable Time”

The concept of “reasonableness” is essentially a value judgment, the determination of which will usually turn on the facts of each case. Reasonableness is not capable of precise ascertainment. Hence, in James Raj the Court expressly declined to identify the exact moment in time at which the applicant became entitled to consult counsel.8 How then can a “reasonable time” be measured?

In James Raj, the Court’s approach to what constituted a “reasonable time” to access counsel ultimately reduced to this question: whether access to counsel would have hindered police investigations.9 The Court accepted the prosecution’s submissions that investigations were complex and lengthy. But what the prosecution had to show was why and how access to counsel would have undermined those investigations. In this regard, the prosecution “failed to furnish substantive grounds in support of its claim that permitting the applicant access to counsel would jeopardise those investigations”.10 Accordingly, it had not been reasonable for the prosecution to withhold access to counsel.

The Court’s approach in James Raj (ie whether access to counsel would undermine police investigations) appears to have been the result of the way in which the parties had presented their submissions, rather than a general and exhaustive statement of how the “reasonable time” issue must be analysed. The stark question of whether access to counsel would undermine police investigations may have been appropriate on the facts in James Raj. But as a general approach, its focus seems too narrow. 

For example, to what extent must investigations be hindered before the prosecution discharges its burden? Is it enough for there to be a risk that investigations may be jeopardised? Does it matter how serious the committed offence is? If the police and prosecution explain in good faith how allowing access to counsel would jeopardise investigations, is the Court really in a position to disagree?11 And if not, what margin of appreciation should be given to the police? Simply asking whether access to counsel will hinder investigations does not answer any of these questions. 

A Proposed Conceptual Framework 

The content of rights should take into account the societal values and norms within which those same rights operate. Hence the idea of “reasonable time” in the context of the art 9(3) right should similarly depend on the broader policy considerations that underpin the criminal justice system in Singapore. Indeed, certain observations by the Court of Appeal in Tan Chor Jin v Public Prosecutor [2008] 4 SLR(R) 306 lend support to such an approach.12

The traditional model of criminal justice in Singapore is that of “crime-control”.13 Such a model prioritises the repression of crime in society. The model is premised on the efficient operation of administrative and prosecutorial expertise. However, the Minister for Law has recently described what he called a “shift” in the Government’s position on criminal justice. At the Opening Address of the Criminal Law Conference 2014 held in Singapore on 16 and 17 January 2014, the Minister described four main principles which he said the administration of criminal justice is based on:

1. Protection of society;

2. Due process for accused persons;

3. Effective law enforcement; and

4. Rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders.

The Minister also said that it was necessary to balance the effective suppression of crime with fairness to the accused. So it is arguable that whereas in the past Singapore may have presumptively favoured protection of society over due process, there is now a discernible need to conduct some form of balancing exercise between the two in order to find the sweet spot for our maturing society. It is submitted that the four principles identified by the Minister create a convenient prima facie framework within which the content of the right of access to counsel (in particular, what amounts to a reasonable time) can be determined. 

Protection of society and effective law enforcement are two principles that pull in the same direction. Protection of society would allow the Court to consider wider policy driven objectives bearing on society’s interests. For example, the Court could take into account the extent to which society was or could be endangered, such as whether the full extent of the crime has been uncovered. Take a person who is arrested on the suspicion of planting a bomb somewhere in Orchard Road. The bomb is not yet found. The Court should be entitled to take account of the risk and harm of detonation in deciding whether the suspect should be granted access to counsel. On the other hand, if the bomb is recovered and found to be a hoax, the Court should also be allowed to take that fact into account in deciding whether the suspect is entitled to access legal advice. 

The principle of effective law enforcement would require consideration of subtly different factors. These factors would be primarily focused on whether access to counsel would hinder investigations in the particular case, and if so how. This is the enquiry undertaken by the Court in James Raj. 

Pulling in the opposite direction are the principles of due process and rehabilitation and reintegration. Due process would require the Court to recognise that access to counsel is crucial for ensuring fairness to the suspect.14 The Court would have to ask to what extent protection of society and effective law enforcement justify delaying access to counsel. Proportionality may surface. For example, ceteris paribus, it seems intuitively correct that the less likely access to counsel will hinder investigations, the shorter period of time a suspect should be denied counsel.   

The principle of rehabilitation and reintegration reinforces that of due process. There is nothing more conducive of embitterment than a person who is wrongly convicted and who believes that he was also denied due process. Take the hypothetical example of a person who is subtly coerced into giving a false confession15 and is convicted solely on the basis of that confession (which he is not allowed to retract at the trial). Or take another hypothetical where the police officer recording the statement refuses to record down certain facts that later turn out to be material (and which the suspect did not know was material at the time), and the trial Court later draws an adverse inference against the suspect on the basis of the said “omission”.

Tailored Solutions

The conceptual framework set out above can provide a basic scheme to classify the various factors relevant to determining what a “reasonable time” to access counsel is. Just as importantly, it can also help frame what the appropriate order or solution ought to be. In this regard, it should be appreciated that access to counsel is not necessarily an “all or nothing” dichotomy. As the Court in James Raj observed (at [14]):

It may be argued that if access to counsel is permitted, there is nothing to stop the applicant from consulting his counsel for hours upon hours, thereby depriving the police of much time which could be spent questioning him. Or, the applicant might refuse to be interviewed by the police unless his counsel was present. But if these are the concerns, they are better addressed by delineating the content of the right to counsel, eg specifying the amount of time which the arrested person is entitled to spend with his counsel per day, rather than by doing away with the right entirely so long as investigations are ongoing. Access to counsel is not unlimited and unrestricted access. The investigators also need access to the suspect.

To the extent that the right of access to counsel is not untrammelled or unqualified,16 the key question then becomes the extent to which the said right should be qualified. Following James Raj, it appears that it is open to the Court to grant flexible access to counsel depending on the particular circumstances of the case – eg one hour for the lawyer every week to explain to the suspect his basic rights and options.17

Additionally, it is suggested that the right of access to counsel can be upheld in different ways, and not only through a direct grant of access to counsel. To the extent that the art 9(3) right ensures due process, the right of access to counsel can be upheld indirectly through ensuring that the accused is given a fair trial. 

To provide one illustration, assume that the police and prosecution have provided cogent reasons for believing that, in a particular case, even brief access to counsel will hinder investigations which are needed for the collection of objective evidence and witness statements to be used against the suspect. Further assume that the prosecution is asking for the suspect to be denied access to counsel for an inordinately long period of say one month. The suspect’s lawyer argues that his client presents no prevailing danger to society and that his client has complained through an intermediary that the police is pressuring him to confess. At first sight, the Court appears (un)comfortably emplaced atop Morton’s fork. 

But the dilemma may be resolved if the Court asks the prosecution to undertake that any incriminating statements extracted from the suspect before access to counsel is granted will not be adduced at the trial against the suspect. Alternatively, that the prosecution will not seek to draw an adverse inference against the suspect at the trial for any material omissions in statements given before the suspect meets his lawyer. If the prosecution is willing to give such an undertaking, it not only reinforces its position that critical investigations are being underway (because it may be inferred that the prosecution expects to uncover other evidence to convict), it also underscores the Courts’ commitment to due process. And while compromises rarely please all parties, this compromise is fair to prosecution and defence for four reasons. First, the police and prosecution are given the free hand they require to conduct investigations. Second, if the police has only one confession to show after their requested one month of unimpeded “investigations”, that would be cause for some worry – perhaps they arrested the wrong person? Third, the due process concern that a confession was coerced is minimised (because it will not be used in trial). Fourth, if police investigations do uncover objective evidence to convict the suspect, there is no injustice of a wrongful conviction.

Conclusion18 

It has been submitted that the art 9(3) constitutional right of access to counsel ought to be interpreted in the light of multi-faceted policy concerns. The best way to address as many of these concerns as possible is for parties to avoid an “all or nothing” dichotomy. The duty of the Prosecution is not to secure a conviction at all costs. Instead, it is to uphold the administration of justice in assisting the Court in coming to the correct decision.19 To the extent that due process forms an integral part of the administration of criminal justice in Singapore, the Prosecution and Defence counsel are in this regard partners in a common enterprise. When a dispute over access to counsel arises, parties should as far as possible work with the Court towards finding a solution that protects society, respects due process, and allows efficient law enforcement.  

► Tham Lijing*
     Associate
     Tan Rajah & Cheah
     E-mail: [email protected]

* BA (Oxon), BCL

Notes

1 Jasbir Singh and another v Public Prosecutor [1994] 1 SLR(R) 782 at [47]-[48]. See also the doubts expressed by Choo Han Teck J in James Raj s/o Arokiasamy v Public Prosecutor [2014] SGHC 10 at [6].

2 At [1] of the Judgment.

3 See [8] and [9] of the Judgment.

4 At [6] of the Judgment.

5 At [12] of the Judgment.

6 At [14] of the Judgment.

7 Eg see “Police need to justify delaying access to lawyers, says judge”, Today (15 January 2014).

8 At [15] of the Judgment.

9 At [14] of the Judgment.

10 At [13] of the Judgment.

11 Especially since Singapore adopts the “crime-control model”, under which law enforcement agencies are trusted to act with integrity and efficiency: “From Justice Model to Crime Control Model”, Address by Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong at the International Conference on Criminal Justice Under Stress, 24 November 2006.

12 The Court of Appeal made the following observations in relation to the issue of whether the right of access to counsel can be waived (at [68]-[70]):

68 It is apparent that for the purposes of determining whether the denial of counsel to an accused person amounts to a violation of the latter’s constitutional right, a common foundation upon which the foreign cases surveyed above rests is the universal concept of fairness to the accused … Such an approach should also factor in the competing interests (if any) of other concerned parties, while maintaining at the same time the focus on whether any undue unfairness or prejudice has been caused to the accused as a result of his lack of representation – in short, a holistic approach should be adopted ……

70 … If Tan’s would-be counsel were allowed by the court to cross-examine the witnesses all over again and devise new submissions, that would surely be unfair to the Prosecution, which had already presented its case, and, indeed, to all the other relevant parties, such as the witnesses if they had to be recalled … Put another way, fairness is a multi-faceted concept even in criminal proceedings, and a concession to an accused’s right to counsel cannot be allowed to progress to an abuse of the judicial process.

13 Chan Sek Keong, “The criminal process – The Singapore model” (1996) Sing. L. Rev. 433 at 440.

14 Tan Chor Jin v Public Prosecutor at [68].

15 Police impropriety in the extraction of admissions or confessions, while perhaps rare, are not unheard of: see Muhammad bin Kadar and another v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 1205 at [140]. The line between lawful and unlawful “encouragement” can also be quite fine.

16 See eg Tan Chor Jin v Public Prosecutor at [54].

17 There is some analogy perhaps to be drawn with Court orders granting parental access to a child.

18 See also a more general discussion in Chen Siyuan and Kenneth Tan Jun Hua, “Further Clarification from the High Court on the limits to the constitutional right to counsel”, SLW Commentary Issue 3/Jan 2014.

 

19 Muhammad bin Kadar and another v Public Prosecutor at [109].